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ARTICLE

READING CASES

FOR

EMPATHY

JENNIFER L. CORNELL*
The only effect I ardently long to produce by my writings, is that
those who read them should be better able to imagine and to feel
the pains and the joys of those who differ from them in everything
but the broad fact of being struggling erring human creatures.
— George Eliot1
Anyone who cried when Beth died in Little Women, or cheered when
Harry Potter exacted his revenge on Voldemort, has experienced the transportive power of literary fiction. When we read, we become one with the
story’s protagonists, experiencing their thoughts and emotions firsthand.
Reading fiction “gives us the ability to feel empathy for people we’ve never
met, living lives we couldn’t possibly experience for ourselves, because the
book puts us inside the character’s skin,” says author Ann Patchett.2 Cognitive psychologists have confirmed these empathetic effects.3 Characterbased stories improve our understanding of others and underscore our
shared humanity.
Reading legal cases can have similar effects. Although judicial opinions are less emotionally intense than literary fiction, they can evoke empathy in the same way. Opinions that focus on human “characters” use literary
techniques to frame cases from their perspectives. Especially in cases involving criminal and constitutional law, human stories are central to the
courts’ narratives. Like literature, these opinions expand readers’ experiences, putting them “in the skin” of others.
The importance of empathy in the legal profession is now widely recognized.4 A lawyer who can view an issue from multiple perspectives is a
* Visiting Professor, University of St. Thomas School of Law; J.D. 2000, Harvard Law
School; B.A. 1997, University of Michigan.
1. Rebecca Mead, George Eliot and the Secret of Motherhood, NEW YORKER (May 8,
2014), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/george-eliot-and-the-secret-of-mother
hood (quoting George Eliot).
2. Ann Patchett, The Triumph of the Readers, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2009), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB123214794600191819.
3. See infra Part II.
4. Lauren A. Newell, Rebooting Empathy for the Digital Generation, 34 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 1, 24–48 (2019); Ian Gallacher, Thinking Like Nonlawyers: Why Empathy Is a Core
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more effective counselor, advocate, negotiator, writer, and adjudicator.5
Empathy training complements analytic training as a critical component of
the law school curriculum.6 Empathy and analytics merge when students
read legal cases. Judicial opinions—the primary tool for teaching legal
analysis—can also foster empathy. As students read opinions to identify
issues, understand rules, and solve legal problems, they simultaneously gain
valuable “perspective taking” skills.
I. THE IMPORTANCE

OF

EMPATHY

The term “empathy” originally described a kinesthetic connection with
a work of art,7 but by the early twentieth century, psychologists began to
view empathy as a way to understand interpersonal relationships.8 Contemporary neuroscientists have validated this meaning through neuroimaging
studies.9 They have shown that during empathy-inducing encounters, we
activate the same neural circuits as others while simultaneously understanding what they are going through on an intellectual level.10 Thus empathy
has both emotional (affective) and cognitive (thinking) components.11 Dr.
Helen Riess, a professor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School and director of the Empathy and Relational Science Program at Massachusetts General Hospital, writes that empathy is an “exercise in perspective taking.”12
Even if we do not feel the exact same emotion as someone else, we are
empathetic if we are able to access a similar experience cognitively through
imagination.13
Viewed in this broad “perspective taking” sense, empathy is generally
(but not always)14 a desirable trait. Empathy plays a critical social role for
humans, “enabling sharing of experiences, needs, and desires between indiLawyering Skill and Why Legal Education Should Change to Reflect Its Importance, LEGAL
COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 109, 112 (2011); Kristin B. Gerdy, Clients, Empathy, and Compassion: Introducing First-Year Students to the “Heart” of Lawyering, 87 NEB. L. REV. 1, 15–19
(2008).
5. Newell, supra note 4, at 24–48.
6. Gallacher, supra note 4, at 146–48.
7. HELEN RIESS, THE EMPATHY EFFECT: SEVEN NEUROSCIENCE-BASED KEYS FOR TRANSFORMING THE WAY WE LIVE, LOVE, WORK, AND CONNECT ACROSS DIFFERENCES 12 (2018).
8. Id. at 13.
9. Id. at 15.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 11.
12. Id. Riess argues that together with the emotional and cognitive components, “empathetic
concern,” or the compassionate response to others, is the third facet of empathy. Id. at 24. However, this definition of empathy has not been universally accepted. For example, in BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE, infra note 31, at 574, Steven Pinker argues that an altruistic concern for
others “cannot be equated with the ability to think what they are thinking or feel what they are
feeling.” I use “empathy” in the emotional and cognitive senses in this article. While empathy is
usually associated with compassion, as discussed below, that is not part of its definition.
13. RIESS, supra note 7, at 11.
14. For a critique of empathy as a moral guide, see PAUL BLOOM, AGAINST EMPATHY: THE
CASE FOR RATIONAL COMPASSION (2016).
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viduals and providing an emotional bridge that promotes prosocial behavior.”15 It results in everyday sensitivity toward others, as well as “longer
term, more deliberate prosocial behaviors,” like volunteerism and charitable
donations.16 In today’s polarized society, empathy is an antidote to tribalism—“a psychological ‘superglue’ that connects people and undergirds cooperation and kindness.”17
For lawyers in particular, empathy is the “cornerstone” of the profession.18 President Obama famously applied an “empathy litmus test” in his
search for a Supreme Court justice in 2009, declaring empathy “an essential
ingredient for arriving at just decisions and outcomes.”19 Empathy inhabits
nearly every aspect of legal practice, including client counseling, legal writing, advocacy, and negotiation.20 Empathetic lawyers understand their clients’ goals and concerns to provide good counsel.21 They look at disputes
from the perspectives of opposing counsel, judges, and juries to develop
persuasive arguments and counterarguments.22 They write effectively because they “anticipate what the reader will be thinking and [provide] the
information the reader seeks precisely when the reader needs it.”23 Professor Kristin Gerdy compares the role of a lawyer to that of a “translator”:
As such, she needs to be able to empathize with the other side in
order to translate that point of view for her client during settlement negotiations. She also needs to empathize with what opposing counsel is experiencing in order to relate effectively with her.
She needs to empathize with the judge or the jury in order to
know their concerns and address them as she conveys information
to her client and as she makes her own strategic judgments.24
15. Helen Riess, The Science of Empathy, 4 J. PATIENT EXPERIENCE 74, 74 (2017), https://
journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2374373517699267.
16. Newell, supra note 4, at 23 (citing Sara Konrath, Can Text Messages Make People
Kinder?, in CHARACTER: NEW DIRECTIONS FROM PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THEOLOGY 412,
415 (Christian B. Miller et al. eds., 2015)).
17. How to Increase Empathy and Unite Society, ECONOMIST (June 7, 2019), https://
www.economist.com/open-future/2019/06/07/how-to-increase-empathy-and-unite-society (interview with Jamil Zaki).
18. Gerdy, supra note 4, at 17.
19. Peter Slevin, In Filling Vacancy, Obama Looks for a Jurist with Empathy, WASH. POST
(May 13, 2009), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/12/AR2009
051203515.html. President Obama’s remarks sparked a heated debate about the proper role of
empathy for judges. Much of the controversy, however, may be due to differing definitions of
empathy. Those who argue against empathy in judging may view it mostly in emotional terms.
Few would dispute that empathy—in the broad “perspective taking” sense—is a desirable trait for
judges. See Newell, supra note 4, at 45–46.
20. Newell, supra note 4, at 24–48 (summarizing empathy’s role in each of these areas).
21. Newell, supra note 4, at 25–31.
22. Newell, supra note 4, at 35–36.
23. Ian Gallacher, Do RoboMemos Dream of Electric Nouns?: A Search for the Soul of Legal
Writing, 4 CASE W. RSRV. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 41, 53 (2012).
24. Gerdy, supra note 4, at 18–19.
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In short, a lawyer’s ability to “project him or herself into the thoughts of
another” is of “extraordinary value.”25
Although some people are naturally more empathetic than others, psychologists believe that empathy can be learned and practiced. Paul Anderson and Sara Konrath compare it to “a muscle capable of growth, atrophy,
disability, and even regeneration (think Scrooge).”26 There are several
proven techniques for increasing empathy, including communication training (especially in nonverbal techniques such as eye contact, facial expressions, posture, tone of voice, and active listening), role-playing, mindful
meditation, exposure to varied cultures and people, and transportive experiences through art, film, theater, and print.27 Reading literary fiction in particular seems to build a capacity to understand what others are thinking and
feeling.28
II.

THE EMPATHETIC EFFECTS

OF

READING LITERARY FICTION

Writers, moral philosophers, and social psychologists have long extolled the virtues of reading literature.29 “Empathy is at the heart of the
novel,” writes Azar Nafisi in Reading Lolita in Tehran.30 Philosopher
Martha Nussbaum agrees: “Novels . . . speak to an implicit reader who
shares with the characters certain hopes, fears, and general human concerns,
and who for that reason is able to form bonds of identification and sympathy with them.”31 Psychologist Steven Pinker calls fiction “empathy technology” that “encourages one to step outside the parochial constraints of
one’s birth and station, to consider hypothetical worlds, and to reflect back
on the habits, impulses, and institutions that govern one’s beliefs and values.”32 These scholars speak in dramatic terms about literature’s social
value. Reading, they contend, builds bridges of understanding among
people.
25. Gallacher, supra note 4, at 112.
26. Newell, supra note 4, at 65 (quoting Paul Anderson & Sara Konrath, “Why Should We
Care?”—What to Do About Declining Student Empathy, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 31, 2011),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/why-should-we-care-what-to-do-about-declining-student-empathy/.
27. See RIESS, supra note 7, at 43–58, 125–145; ROMAN KRZNARIC, EMPATHY: WHY IT MATTERS, AND HOW TO GET IT 164–65 (2014); Newell, supra note 4, at 65.
28. RIESS, supra note 7, at 133.
29. For a historical survey of social attitudes toward reading fiction, see SUZANNE KEEN,
EMPATHY AND THE NOVEL 37–64 (2007). Professor Keen herself is skeptical about fiction’s empathetic effects. While she acknowledges that fictional characters often invite empathy, she argues
that not all characters evoke empathy. Id. at xii. Further, she questions the link between reading
fiction and real-world compassion. Id. at 145–68.
30. AZAR NAFISI, READING LOLITA IN TEHRAN 111 (2003).
31. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 7
(1995).
32. STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE 477–78 (2012). The “empathy
technology” Pinker refers to includes all forms of fiction, not just literature.
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Cognitive psychologists have now confirmed these empathetic effects.
In a pioneering study, Dutch psychologist Jèmeljan Hakemulder found less
reflexive acceptance of rigid gender roles in Algeria among people who
read part of a novel about experiences of an Algerian woman.33 Subsequently, psychologist Raymond Mar found a significant association between reading fiction and high scores on the “Mind in the Eyes Test,”
which measures how well people can identify others’ emotional states
through facial expressions.34 Building upon Mar’s “Mind in the Eyes Test”
as an index of empathy, psychologists David Kidd and Emanuele Castano
independently confirmed higher empathy scores among people who regularly read literary fiction than among those who read nonfiction, popular
fiction, or nothing at all.35
Psychologist Keith Oatley cites evidence that shows the association
between literature and empathy is causal, not merely correlational.36 He
posits that both the process of reading literary fiction and the content of
literary fiction promote empathy.37 One type of process is inference; reading requires us to understand characters using inferences about what people
mean and what kinds of people they are.38 Another type of process is transportation.39 Higher immersion in a vivid story leads to higher empathetic
responses toward both fictional characters and real people.40 The content of
literary fiction—complex characters who differ from us—also fosters empathy.41 Oatley calls this “pluralism.”42 Fiction, he writes, “invites us to
engage in many circumstances and to experience many emotions in relation
to many kinds of people.”43
III.

THE SIMILARITIES

BETWEEN

LITERARY FICTION

AND

LEGAL CASES

A legal case is obviously not fiction, and reading a judicial opinion
does not generally elicit the same intensity of emotional response as reading
a short story or a novel. The emotional power of a judicial opinion is necessarily constrained by its form and function—to interpret the law and apply
33. Keith Oatley, Fiction: Simulation of Social Worlds, 20 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCIS. 618, 619
(2016) (citing JÈMELJAN HAKEMULDER, THE MORAL LABORATORY: EXPERIMENTS EXAMINING THE
EFFECTS OF READING LITERATURE ON SOCIAL PERCEPTION AND MORAL SELF-CONCEPT (2000)).
34. Id. (citing Raymond A. Mar et al., Exploring the Link Between Reading Fiction and
Empathy: Ruling Out Individual Differences and Examining Outcomes, 34 COMMC’NS 407–29
(2009)).
35. David Comer Kidd & Emanuele Castano, Reading Literary Fiction Improves Theory of
Mind, 342 SCIENCE 377, 377 (2013).
36. Oatley, supra note 32, at 620.
37. Oatley, supra note 32, at 621.
38. Oatley, supra note 32, at 621.
39. Oatley, supra note 32, at 621.
40. Oatley, supra note 32, at 621.
41. Oatley, supra note 32, at 622–24.
42. Oatley, supra note 32, at 624.
43. Oatley, supra note 32, at 624.
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it to the facts of a particular case. Opinions are written to resolve disputes,
not to entertain.44 Nevertheless, judicial opinions and literature have much
in common. As Judge Richard Posner points out, the fundamental elements
of the two forms are the same:
maintaining awareness of audience, building to a punch line,
maintaining a degree of suspense (so that the reader will read attentively to the end and the opinion won’t seem merely a rationalization of preexisting decision), selecting the essential facts to
include in the narrative and arranging them clearly and consecutively, and telling the story in a narrative voice that conveys authority and credibility.45
Indeed, an entire field of study uses narrative theory to analyze the
“stories” embedded in the law.46 Competing stories are the essence of legal
disputes; the court must interpret and assemble these stories into “seamless
webs of argument and narrative” in a judicial opinion.47 The stories the
court tells can take many forms: the story of the human conflict that gave
rise to the legal dispute, the story of the lower court proceedings, the story
of what did not happen or what could happen in the future, the story of
comparable past cases, or the story of legal or social change.48 A single
opinion may contain many stories.49 Within constraints, the authoring judge
can choose which stories to emphasize and how to tell them.50
At the appellate level, where the court’s primary function is to interpret the law rather than to determine facts, broader legal considerations
often subsume the individual stories underlying a particular dispute. In fact,
some appellate opinions have been criticized for “de-humanizing” the parties.51 But human stories are central to some of the seminal opinions featured in the first-year law school curriculum, especially those in criminal
and constitutional law. The facts of the case and the human interests at
stake feature prominently in the court’s overall narrative. Although the
44. Although some judicial opinions are, in fact, entertaining. See generally, CORPUS JURIS
HUMOROUS (John B. McClay & Wendy L. Matthews eds., 1991) (compilation of humorous judicial opinions).
45. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW & LITERATURE 350 (3d ed. 2009).
46. See LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul
Gewirtz eds., 1996).
47. Peter Brooks, The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND
RHETORIC IN THE LAW, id. at 21.
48. John Leubsdorf, The Structure of Judicial Opinions, 86 MINN. L. REV. 447, 448 (2001).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 452.
51. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES, JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF MASKS (2002) (arguing that many famous opinions disregard
and consciously avoid the details about the humans involved). Judge Noonan’s own appellate
opinions focused on the human interests at stake. Julie A. Oseid, I See You: Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., Writing with Empathy to Prove That the Human Person Is Central to the Law, see infra
952.
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“characters” lack the depth of their literary counterparts,52 they evoke empathy in much the same way. Like literary fiction, these judicial opinions
use character inferences, vivid imagery, and pluralism to put the reader “in
the skin” of their “characters.” Three famous Supreme Court opinions exemplify these techniques.
A. Character Inferences in Graham v. Florida
Perhaps the most empathy-inducing legal cases are criminal ones.
Even in appellate cases involving questions of law, individual stories are at
the core of criminal judicial opinions. Complex, sometimes tragic, defendants are the main characters in the statements of fact. Like protagonists in
literary fiction, they require the reader to make inferences about their
character.
Terrance Graham is one such figure. His juvenile sentence of life in
prison without parole for a nonhomicide crime was the subject of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Graham v. Florida.53 Justice Kennedy wrote the
majority opinion, holding that the sentence was disproportional to the crime
and thus violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth
Amendment.54 The opinion begins with background about Graham’s
childhood:
He was born on January 6, 1987. Graham’s parents were addicted
to crack cocaine, and their drug use persisted in his early
years. Graham was diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder in elementary school. He began drinking alcohol and using tobacco at age 9 and smoked marijuana at age 13.55
It then describes Graham’s first run-in with the law:
In July 2003, when Graham was age 16, he and three other
school-age youths attempted to rob a barbeque restaurant in Jacksonville, Florida. One youth, who worked at the restaurant, left
the back door unlocked just before closing time. Graham and another youth, wearing masks, entered through the unlocked door.
Graham’s masked accomplice twice struck the restaurant manager
in the back of the head with a metal bar. When the manager
started yelling at the assailant and Graham, the two youths ran out
and escaped in a car driven by the third accomplice. The restaurant manager required stitches for his head injury. No money was
taken. . . .
On December 18, 2003, Graham pleaded guilty to [two charges]
under a plea agreement. Graham wrote a letter to the trial court.
After reciting “this is my first and last time getting in trouble,” he
52.
53.
54.
55.

Leubsdorf, supra note 48, at 462–63.
560 U.S. 48 (2010).
Id. at 82.
Id. at 53.
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continued, “I’ve decided to turn my life around.” . . . Graham
said, “I made a promise to God and myself that if I get a second
chance, I’m going to do whatever it takes to get to the [National
Football League].”56
The opinion then portrays Graham’s rapid downward spiral. “Less
than six months later,” he was arrested for an alleged home invasion robbery, an attempted second robbery, and possession of a firearm:57
As Graham drove away, a police sergeant signaled him to stop.
Graham continued at a high speed but crashed into a telephone
pole. He tried to flee on foot but was apprehended. Three handguns were found in his car.
When detectives interviewed Graham, he denied involvement in
the crimes. He said he encountered [the two accomplices] only
after [one accomplice] had been shot. One of the detectives told
Graham that the victims of the home invasion had identified him.
He asked Graham, “Aside from the two robberies tonight how
many more were you involved in?” Graham responded, “Two to
three before tonight.” . . . The night that Graham allegedly committed the robbery, he was 34 days short of his 18th birthday.58
Finally, the opinion includes statements from the trial judge as he sentenced Graham to the maximum sentence authorized by law on each
charge—life imprisonment for the armed burglary and fifteen years for the
attempted armed robbery, without parole:59
“Mr. Graham, as I look back on your case, yours is really candidly a sad situation. You had, as far as I can tell, you have quite
a family structure. You had a lot of people who wanted to try and
help you get your life turned around including the court system,
and you had a judge who took the step to try and give you direction through his probation order to give you a chance to get back
onto track. And at the time you seemed through your letters that
that is exactly what you wanted to do. And I don’t know why it is
that you threw your life away. I don’t know why. . . .
“. . . The only thing that I can rationalize is that you decided that
this is how you were going to lead your life and that there is
nothing that we can do for you.”60
The reader of the opinion infers the Court’s conflicting assessment of
Graham as both a perpetrator and a victim of his circumstances and of a
criminal justice system that abandoned him. Furthermore, through inference, the reader can almost feel the conflicting voices driving Graham’s
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 53–54.
Id.
Id. at 54–55.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 57 (2010).
Id. at 56–57.
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impulsive, hardened, and yet tragic behavior. This process of making inferences about characters promotes empathy.61 The reader of Graham attains a
deeper understanding of the defendant through Justice Kennedy’s detailed
statement of facts.
B. Vivid Imagery in Justice Alito’s Dissent in Snyder v. Phelps
Human stories are also central to many constitutional law cases, especially those involving individual rights. Deeply personal issues can produce
emotional judicial opinions. Justice Alito’s dissent in Snyder v. Phelps is
one example.62 The issue in the case was whether picketing outside a dead
soldier’s funeral service was protected conduct under the First Amendment.63 The jarring facts of the case are recounted in vivid detail in Justice
Alito’s dissent:
Petitioner Albert Snyder is not a public figure. He is simply a
parent whose son, Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, was
killed in Iraq. Mr. Snyder wanted what is surely the right of any
parent who experiences such an incalculable loss: to bury his son
in peace. But respondents, members of the Westboro Baptist
Church, deprived him of that elementary right. They first issued a
press release and thus turned Matthew’s funeral into a tumultuous
media event. They then appeared at the church, approached as
closely as they could without trespassing, and launched a malevolent verbal attack on Matthew and his family at a time of acute
emotional vulnerability. . . .
On the day of the funeral, respondents, true to their word, displayed placards that conveyed the message promised in their
press release. Signs stating “God Hates You” and “Thank God for
Dead Soldiers” reiterated the message that God had caused Matthew’s death in retribution for his sins. . . . Others, stating
“You’re Going to Hell” and “Not Blessed Just Cursed,” conveyed
the message that Matthew was “in Hell—sine die.” . . .
Other signs would most naturally have been understood as suggesting—falsely—that Matthew was gay. Homosexuality was the
theme of many of the signs. There were signs reading “God Hates
Fags,” “Semper Fi Fags,” “Fags Doom Nations,” and “Fag
Troops.”64
The visceral details of the protest immerse the reader in a moving story
about a father’s grief. Justice Alito does not merely summarize the picketers’ messages; he includes every shocking word. Vivid imagery during
reading has been found to improve transportation and to increase empa61.
62.
63.
64.

Oatley, supra note 32, at 621.
562 U.S. 443, 463 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 447. The majority held that the conduct was constitutionally protected. Id. at 463.
Id. at 463–69 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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thy.65 The reader of the dissent in Snyder actually feels the wrenching pain
of a father who wants “to bury his son in peace” amid a vulgar protest.
C. Pluralism in Obergefell v. Hodges
In another emotionally charged case, the Supreme Court took up the
issue of same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges.66 Holding that there is
a constitutional right to marry, the majority opinion, authored by Justice
Kennedy, includes stories about three of the petitioners:
Petitioner James Obergefell, a plaintiff in the Ohio case, met John
Arthur over two decades ago. They fell in love and started a life
together, establishing a lasting, committed relation. In 2011, however, Arthur was diagnosed with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, or
ALS. This debilitating disease is progressive, with no known
cure. Two years ago, Obergefell and Arthur decided to commit to
one another, resolving to marry before Arthur died. To fulfill their
mutual promise, they traveled from Ohio to Maryland, where
same-sex marriage was legal. It was difficult for Arthur to move,
and so the couple were wed inside a medical transport plane as it
remained on the tarmac in Baltimore. Three months later, Arthur
died. Ohio law does not permit Obergefell to be listed as the surviving spouse on Arthur’s death certificate. By statute, they must
remain strangers even in death, a state-imposed separation
Obergefell deems “hurtful for the rest of time.” . . .
April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse are co-plaintiffs in the case from
Michigan. They celebrated a commitment ceremony to honor
their permanent relation in 2007. They both work as nurses, DeBoer in a neonatal unit and Rowse in an emergency unit. In 2009,
DeBoer and Rowse fostered and then adopted a baby boy. Later
that same year, they welcomed another son into their family. The
new baby, born prematurely and abandoned by his biological
mother, required around-the-clock care. The next year, a baby girl
with special needs joined their family. Michigan, however, permits only opposite-sex married couples or single individuals to
adopt, so each child can have only one woman as his or her legal
parent. If an emergency were to arise, schools and hospitals may
treat the three children as if they had only one parent. And, were
tragedy to befall either DeBoer or Rowse, the other would have
no legal rights over the children she had not been permitted to
adopt. This couple seeks relief from the continuing uncertainty
their unmarried status creates in their lives.
Army Reserve Sergeant First Class Ijpe DeKoe and his partner
Thomas Kostura, co-plaintiffs in the Tennessee case, fell in love.
In 2011, DeKoe received orders to deploy to Afghanistan. Before
65. Oatley, supra note 32, at 621.
66. 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
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leaving, he and Kostura married in New York. A week later,
DeKoe began his deployment, which lasted for almost a year.
When he returned, the two settled in Tennessee, where DeKoe
works full-time for the Army Reserve. Their lawful marriage is
stripped from them whenever they reside in Tennessee, returning
and disappearing as they travel across state lines. DeKoe, who
served this Nation to preserve the freedom the Constitution protects, must endure a substantial burden.67
These moving stories allow the reader to experience the case from
three different couples’ perspectives. Pluralism promotes empathy by expanding the reader’s range of experience.68 The Obergefell opinion puts the
reader “in the lives” of James Obergefell, John Arthur, April DeBoer, Jayne
Rowse, Ijpe DeKoe, and Thomas Kostura to feel their pain and longing.
IV. READING CASES

FOR

EMPATHY

IN

LAW SCHOOL

Empathy has rightfully assumed a place alongside legal analysis as a
“core lawyering skill.”69 Many law schools now offer specific empathy
training, either as part of the first-year curriculum or through upper-level
electives.70 Mentor relationships with local attorneys can powerfully introduce students to the kind of empathetic behavior they should emulate in
practice.71 Supervised clinical courses allow students to observe and practice empathy skills with real clients.72 Client counseling, negotiation, and
alternative dispute resolution courses offer similar experiences through simulation.73 Others, like “Serving Clients Well” at the University of St.
Thomas, incorporate the science of psychology to teach empathetic communication and decision-making skills.74 These classes emphasize the interpersonal skills that are at the “heart” of effective lawyering.75
Other courses use literary fiction itself as a means of stimulating empathy, drawing upon the work of Keith Oatley and others. Martha Nussbaum,
67. Id. at 658–59.
68. Oatley, supra note 32, at 624.
69. Gallacher, supra note 4, at 110.
70. Newell, supra note 4, at 73 n.381 (sample of course offerings at American and international law schools).
71. Gerdy, supra note 4, at 58. The acclaimed mentor externship program at the University
of St. Thomas is an example of this type of empathy modeling.
72. Philip M. Genty, Clients Don’t Take Sabbaticals: The Indispensable In-House Clinic and
the Teaching of Empathy, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 273, 275 (2000) (“[E]mpathy skills can be taught
only with actual clients and only in an in-house model in which we are working directly with the
students and clients.”).
73. Newell, supra note 4, at 74–77.
74. The “Serving Clients Well” course includes excerpts from JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT &
JEAN R. STERLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS: UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION, AND DECISION MAKING (2012) and PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON
KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING, AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR
LAWYERS AND POLICY MAKERS (2010).
75. Gerdy, supra note 4, at 3.
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a pioneer in the “law and literature” field, writes that literature gives students “the ability to think what it might be like to be in the shoes of a
person different from oneself, to be an intelligent reader of that person’s
story, and to understand the emotions, wishes and desires that someone so
placed might have.”76 The main thesis of her book Poetic Justice is that
reading works by authors such as Dickens, Whitman, and Wright arouses
empathy, which in turn leads to better legal judgment.77 Professor Kristin
Gerdy suggests that, in addition to full-length novels, law schools could
incorporate short stories or poems into their curricula.78 Other scholars, particularly those in fields of feminist and critical race law, have expanded the
list of recommended reading to include a wider range of empathy-inducing
“voices.”79
A related method of empathy training exposes students to “the human
side of lawyering” through “case stories” about real lawyers and clients.80
These stories give students a fuller picture of the facts in real cases to better
empathize with the people involved.81 For example, the Trial Stories book
features in-depth descriptions of nine iconic trials, including the Aaron Burr
trial and the Vioxx litigation.82 As a supplement to traditional casebooks,
“case stories” highlight the real human implications of court decisions.83
These methods all teach empathy as separate from—and even as opposed to84—legal analysis. But students may also acquire some empathy
skills in conjunction with learning analytic skills. In contrast to the didactic
textbooks used to teach subjects like engineering and physics, legal
casebooks teach substantive law through real cases about real people. Judicial opinions that focus on human stories evoke empathy in the same way as
literary fiction—through character inferences, vivid imagery, and pluralism.
When students learn about proportionality of criminal punishments in Graham v. Florida, they encounter a complex, tragic young defendant. When
they learn about freedom of speech in Snyder v. Phelps, they feel the pain
76. Martha C. Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity in Legal Education, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 265,
270 (2003).
77. Amnon Reichman, Law, Literature, and Empathy: Between Withholding and Reserving
Judgment, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 296, 303 (2006) (reviewing Martha Nussbaum’s POETIC JUSTICE,
supra note 30, on its tenth anniversary).
78. Gerdy, supra note 4, at 44, 55.
79. Michael Pantazakos, Ad Humanitatem Pertinent: A Personal Reflection on the History
and Purpose of the Law and Literature Movement, 7 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 31, 41–42
(1995).
80. Gerdy, supra note 4, at 55.
81. Gerdy, supra note 4, at 55.
82. MICHAEL E. TIGAR & ANGELA J. DAVIS, TRIAL STORIES (2008).
83. Id.
84. Professor Ian Gallacher believes that first-year doctrinal classes may actually reduce students’ empathy. Gallacher, supra note 4, at 116 (“[T]he empathetic response is systematically
trained out of [students] in a first-year curriculum in which most, if not all, their doctrinal classes
share the common attribute of changing the way students think, from intelligent laypeople to
‘lawyers.’”).
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of a grief-stricken father mourning his son. When they learn about the constitutional right to marry in Obergefell v. Hodges, they are drawn into the
lives of three couples yearning for its privileges and responsibilities.
Reading cases is certainly not a substitute for other methods of empathy training in law school. A judicial opinion typically does not arouse the
same degree of empathy as a novel, a short story, or a “case story.” And
reading is not nearly as impactful as practicing empathy through real or
simulated client interactions.85 But the “perspective taking” effects of reading judicial opinions that include human stories may at least contribute to
students’ empathetic development. It “may be more than a coincidence that
the English novel arose during the same period as English judicial opinions
with developed statements of facts.”86 Both kinds of stories broaden our
understanding of people—the essence of being an effective lawyer. Reading, whether literature or cases, is an inherently empathetic act.

85. Joshua D. Rosenberg, Teaching Empathy in Law School, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 621, 637
(2002) (“[T]he ability to empathize is a behavioral skill, rather than a cognitive process.”).
86. Leubsdorf, supra note 47, at 463.

